Lawrence and Sarah Jean Colosimo, Individually and as the Natural Parents and Heirs of Adam Colosimo, Deceased, Appellants, vs. Gateway Community Church, a Appellants\u27 Brief Distdct Court Case No. 120414704 Wd Appellate No. 20140852a Utah Corporation; And Does 1-50, Supreme Court No. 20160838 - Sc Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) 
2017 
Lawrence and Sarah Jean Colosimo, Individually and as the 
Natural Parents and Heirs of Adam Colosimo, Deceased, 
Appellants, vs. Gateway Community Church, a Appellants' Brief 
Distdct Court Case No. 120414704 Wd Appellate No. 20140852a 
Utah Corporation; And Does 1-50, Supreme Court No. 20160838 - 
Sc Appellee 
Utah Supreme Court 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Colosimo v Gateway Community, No. 20160838 (Utah Supreme Court, 2017). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3365 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 










IN THE UTAH SUPREl\,1E COURT 
WITTINGHAM, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; THE MU1R SECOND 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; a 
dissolved Utah limited partnership, and 
DOROTHY JEANNE MUIR, 
Respondents, 
v. 
TNELIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah 
limited partnership~ GA VIN DICKSON; 
BRUCE J. MALCOLM, individually and as 
Trustee of The Bruce J. Malcolm Trust, 
MAUREEN H. MALCOLM, Trustee of 
The Maureen H. Malcolm Trust; DANIEL 
J. TORKELSON, trustee; WILLIAM 
NICHOLAS MUIR; TRillv.lP SECURITY 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
MARIO OZUNA; DWIGHT EGAN; 
:MICHAEL SNOW; BRETT CANDIOTTI; 
TOD DEBIE, ASHTON GIFFORD, 
JULIANA KELLER, MARIO NAUJOKS, 
and STEPHEN HAWKES, 
Petitioner . 
James K. Tracy 
Stacy J. McNeill 
B™NEITTIJELLERJOHNSON &DEERE 
3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Attorneys for Respondents 
TNE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP'S 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND 
RESPONSE TO CROSS-PETITION 
Supreme Court No. 20160805 
Court of Appeals No. 201407 51 
Civil No. 090700547 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini (Bar No. 24 78) 
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994) 
COHNE KINGHORN, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, 11 th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Fax: (801) 363~4378 
jsilvestrini@cohnekinghorn.com 
bstrassberg@cohnekinghom.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
FILED 
UTAH APPELlATE COURTS 
MAY 1 6 2017 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
@ WITTINGHAM, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; THE MUIR SECOND 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; a 
dissolved Utah limited partnership, and 
DOROTHY JEANNE MUIR, 
Respondents, 
V. 
TNE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah 
limited partnership; GA VIN DICKSON; 
BRUCE J. MALCOLM, individually and as 
Trustee of The Bruce J. Malcolm Trust, 
MAUREEN H. MALCOLM, Trustee of 
The Maureen H. Malcolm Trust; DANIEL 
J. TORKELSON, trustee; WILLIAM 
NICHOLAS MUIR; TRU1v1P SECURITY 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
MARIO OZUNA; DWIGHT EGAN; 
MICHAEL SNOW; BRETT CANDIOTTI; 
TOD DEBIE, ASHTON GIFFORD, 
JULIANA KELLER, MARIO NAUJOKS, 
and STEPHEN HAWKES, 
Petitioner. 
James K. Tracy 
Stacy J. McNeill 
BENNETT lUELLERJOHNSON & DEERE 
3165 East Millrock Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Attorneys for Respondents 
TNE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP'S 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND 
RESPONSE TO CROSS-PETITION 
Supreme Court No. 20160805 
Court of Appeals No. 20140751 
Civil No. 09070054 7 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini (Bar No. 24 78) 
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994) 
COHNE KINGHORN, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, 11 th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Fax: (801) 363-4378 
jsilvestrini@cohnekinghom.com 
bstrassberg@cohnekinghom.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Table of Authorities ............................................................................................................ ii 
Response to Respondents' "Statement of the Case" ........................................................... 1 
Summary (?f Arguments on Cross-Appeal .......................................................................... 2 
Argument on Reply Brief .................................................................................................... 3 
I. Respondents Fail to Show the TNE Trust Deed is Void ................... 3 
IL Houston Should be Overruled ............................................................ 9 
III. Respondents Fail to Show that the General Rule of 
Retroactive Application Should Not Apply ..................................... 12 • 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 13 
TNE's Response to Cross-Appeal ..................................................................................... 13 
I. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err ................................................... 14 
IL Respondents Are Not Entitled to Review and Reversal 
of Issues Not Addressed by the Court of Appeals ........................... 16 
III. This Court Can Affirm on Other Grounds Apparent • 
on the Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
a. The Trial Court Properly Applied Section 78B-5-826 
to the TNE Trust Deed ........................................................ 17 
b. Determination of Prevailing Party ........................................ 27 
b. The Equities of This Case Preclude an Award of 
Attorney Fees ........................................................................ 30 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Authorities 
Cases 
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801 ..................................................... 28 
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mtn. Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65,245 P.3d 184 ............................ 7 
Anderson & Karrenbergv. Warnick, 2012 UT App 275,289 P.3d 600 .................... 27, 29 
B. Jnvestment, L.C. v. Anderson,2012 UT App 24,270 P.3d 548 ................................... 25 
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 (Utah 1978) .............................................. 10 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 52 P. 3d 1158 ................................................................... 17 
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993) ................................................................. 9 
Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2 .................................................................... 4, 10 
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) ............................................ 8 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041 ...................................................... 19, 30 
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P. 3d 540 .................................................................... 16 
Bushnell v. Barker, 2012 UT 20, 274 P.3d 968 ............................................................... 19 
Centennial Pointe Owners' Assoc. v. Onyeabor, 2009 UT App 325 (mem.) .................. 28 
Consol. Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268 
• 
(Utah Ct. App.1996) ...................................................................................... 5, 13, 14, 16 
Cook v. Cook, 2013 UT App 57, 298 P.3d 700 ................................................................ 28 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992) ................................................ 26 
Dale K. Barker Co., PC v. Bushnell, 2009 UT App 385,222P.3d1188 ........................ 19 
DeB,y v. Noble, 889 P. 2d 428 (Utah 1995) ................................................................ 2, 17 
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 29 P. 3d 1225 .............................................................. 17 
Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, 345 P.3d 553 .......................................................... 10 
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994) ........................................ 7 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) ............................................... 21, 25 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P .2d 52 (Utah 1998) ........................................................................ 26 
Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P.2d 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ............................................... 4-5 
Gowe v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App 105,356 P.3d 683 ................... 22 
Hooban v. Unicity Int'!., Inc., 2012 UT 40,227 P.3d 256 ......................................... 15, 19 
Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 187 P. 174 (Utah 1919) ............. passim 
Holladay Towne Center, LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, 
198 P.3d 990 ............................................................................................................ 20, 22 
Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2013 UT App 218,310 P.3d 1220 ................................. 8 
In re K.F., 2009 UT 4,201 P.3d 985 .. : ............................................................................ 28 
In re Pando, 1984 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 24486................... ................................................... 24 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 862 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1993) .................. 12 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P .2d 1058 (Utah 1998) .. ................................. 28 
Lee v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66, 147 P.3d 443 ......................................................................... 9 
Loosle v. First Fed Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 858 P.2d 999 (Utah 1993) ................................ 21 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) ...................................................................... 12 
Maynardv. Wharton, 912 P.2d446 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ........................................ 19, 25 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
McCormick v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 308 P.2d 949 (Utah 1957) ...................................... 5 
Merrick Young Inc. v. Wal-Mart Real Est. Bus. Tr., 2011 UT App 164,257 P.3d 1031 . 2 
Millard County Sch. Dist. v. State Bank of Millard Co., 14 P .2d 967 (Utah 1932) ........... 6 
Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 2001 UT 64, 29 P .3d 1231 ...................................... .4-5 
Monarrez v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 2014 UT App 219,335 P. 3d 913 .......................... 12 
Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6,247 P.3d 380 ............................................................................. 28 
Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51 ........................................................ 4-6, 9, 15 
Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,266 P.3d 828 ........................................................ 22 
PC Crane Serv., LLC v. McQueen Masomy, Inc., 2012 UT App 61, 
273 P.3d 396 ................................................................................. 16, 19 
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 22, 301 P .3d 984 .................................... 9 
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) ........................................................... 9 
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P. 2d 98 ....................................................................... 16 
R.T Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 P.3d 1119 ..................................................... 27 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irr. Co., 2011 UT 33, 258 P.3d 539 ............................. 6 
Scottv. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64,356 P. 3d 1172 ............................................. 10 
Short v. Bullion-Beck & Champion Min. Co., 57 P.720 (Utah 1899) ............................... 15 
Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 995 P.2d 14 .............................................................. 23 
Smith v. Simas, 2014 UT App 78, 324 P.3d 667 ......................................................... 27, 29 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) ..................................................................... 23 
Trugreen Companies, LLC v. Mower Bros., Inc., 570 Fed.Appx. 775 
(10th Cir. 20141998) ...................................................................................................... 19 
UP.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 990 P.2d 945 .......................... 26 
Valley Bible Ctr. v. Western Title Ins. Co., 138 Cal.App.3d 931 
. th (Cal App.5 1983) .......................................................................................................... 24 
Velocity Press v. Key Bank, NA, 570 Fed. Appx. 783 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................ 21 
Warner Bros. Theaters v. Cooper Foundation, 189 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1951) ............... 15 
Westmont Mirador LLC v. Shurtliff, 2014 UT App 184,333 P.3d 369 ........................... 29 
Willingham, LLC, et al., v. TNE Limited Partnership, et al., 2016 UT App 187 ............ 14 
Zion's Sav. Bank v. Tropic & East Fork Irr. Co., 126 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1942) ................. 6 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 49 P.3d 402 (Idaho 2002) ................................................................ 15 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-32 ......................................................................................... 4-8, 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2e-804 .............................................................................................. 8 • 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 ............................................................................... 2-3, 13-30 
Other 
Rev. Unif. Part. Act § 804, Comment ................................................................................. 8 
• 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Petitioner TNE Limited Partnership ("TNE") hereby submits its Reply Brief of 
@ Petitioner and Response to Respondents Wittingham, LLC, The Muir Second Family 
Limited Partnership and Dorothy Jeanne Muir ( collectively "Respondents") Cross-
Petition. 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" 
Respondents' "Statement of the Case" is unhelpful to discern or decide the issues 
before this Court. Just as Respondents did when attempting to re-frame the factual issues 
of this case to the Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs "Statement of the Case" strays far beyond 
the actual findings made by the trial court. More often than not, this section is 
ti argumentative, and selectively quotes or misquotes testimony elicited below rather than 
any facts found by the trial court or relied upon by the Court of Appeals. 
This is particularly true regarding Respondents' arguments as to "red flags" of 
f> which TNE should have been aware and as to Respondents' repeated references to Nick 
Muir's purported brain injury. See Respondents' Br., pp. 4-8. The trial court made no 
findings regarding Respondents' "red flags" argument. See R.12450. For each of these 
allegations, the testimony was, at best, in dispute. For many of these allegations, the 
record cites are unsupported and the actual testimony and evidence at trial was to the 
contrary. For instance, Respondents allege that "TNE didn't care about the fraud," or 
that TNE admitted predatory lending. Respondents' Br., pp. 4 and 8. These are realleged 
even though, as already described in the prior briefing to the Court of Appeals, these 
statements are incorrect. See 5/15/13 Tr. Trans., pp. 159, 177-179; 5/20/13 Tr. Trans., 
pp. 80, 98-99. More importantly, Respondents fail to provide any reference to a trial 
1 
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court finding as to such facts, as no such findings exist. The trial court had all the 
relevant testimony before it, and ultimately declined to make any findings relating to the 
"red flags" argument. Respondents did not challenge this decision nor request additional 
findings per a post-judgment motion. Accordingly, these are not "facts" relevant to any 
issue for review. See Merrick Young Inc. v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, 2011 UT 
App 164, if 34, 257 P .3d 1031; see also DeBry v. Noble, 889 P .2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) 
("[t]his Court's grant of a petition for certiorari does not allow a second plenary appeal."). 
As to the repeated mention of Nick Muir's brain injury, this is a non-issue. 
Respondents urged at trial that Nick was mentally incompetent and incapable of 
transacting business. The trial court ruled that Nick was competent and determined his 
testimony on this subject was "self-serving." See Mem. Dec. (R.9784), pp. 16-18. 
Ultimately, much of this section is argument, rather than a recitation of relevant 
facts. Accordingly, this section fails to provide helpful assistance to this Court. TNE 
refers the Court to its own Statement of the Case, based on the facts actually relied upon 
by the Court of Appeals. 
In regard to Respondents' "statement of facts" regarding attorney fees, the 
pleadings of the parties speak for themselves. In addition, there is no finding of record to 
support Respondents' assertion regarding its fee expenditure. To the contrary, the trial 
court ruled that Respondents had yet to properly allocate their fees. See R.11760, ,r 37. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL 
The trial court provided two bases for its denial of Plaintiffs' request for attorney 
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of the TNE Trust Deed; and (2) neither party "prevailed" as required by § 78B-5-826. 
® The trial court also held that, under the circumstances of this case, an award of attorney 
fees would be inequitable. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of attorney fees on the basis 
that, because the TNE Trust Deed was held to be void, it could not form the basis of a 
claim for fees. The Court of Appeals did not address the other bases upon which the trial 
court ruled. 
Respondents appeal this decision, -~ut fail to show the Court of Appeals erred. 
Utah law is clear that a void agreement cannot be enforced by anyone and therefore 
@) cannot be the subject of a reciprocal fee provision. In addition, Respondents seek review 
of the additional bases held by the trial court, but are not entitled to such review as this 
Court only reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals. This Court is, however, able to 
affirm on any basis apparent on the record, and the trial court appropriately denied 
Respondents' claim for fees. Accordingly, Respondent's cross-petition fails. 
(i) . 
@). 
TNE'S REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENTS FAIL TO SHOW THE TNE TRUST DEED IS VOID 
The TNE Trust Deed was a simple trust deed that, in any other case, would be 
deemed valid and enforceable. Here, one of the parties was a dissolved partnership, a 
fact unknown by TNE. See Mem. Dec. (R.9784), pp. 22, 37. Nick Muir entered into the 
contract on behalf of the Dissolved Partnership and TNE's funds were disbursed as 
directed by the Dissolved Partnership. See id., pp. 35-36. 
3 
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The question is whether such a contract is void or voidable. This Court has made 
clear that only one kind of deed is void - one that violates public policy. See Bank of 
America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, iJ 21. Accordingly, the issue here is whether the TNE 
Trust Deed violates public policy. 
The trial court held it was void as against public policy due to the trial court's 
interpretation of Utah Code section 48-1-32(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed this 
decision, but on a different basis. The Court of Appeals ruled that, "although a contrary 
outcome might well be more equitable under the circumstances," given its reading of 
Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 187 P. 174 (Utah 1919), all contracts 
with a dissolved entity must be determined void. 2016 UT App 187, if 11. 
As described in TNE' s opening brief, this ruling was erroneous because: ( 1) this 
Court's decision in Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51, requires a particular 
analysis as to whether a contract is void; and (2) Houston does not assist with this 
analysis. When the Ockey factors are actually applied, it is clear the TNE Trust Deed 
does not violate public policy and is, therefore, not void. 
In response, Respondents argue that Houston, at the time of its issuance and even 
today, "enshrines" applicable public policy, and that the Court of Appeals properly held 
that Houston renders the TNE Trust Deed void. See Respondents' Br., p. 13. This 
argument is unsupported. 
On at least two occasions in recent decades, Utah courts have addressed whether 
contracts with defunct entities were enforceable. See Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P .2d 785 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 2001 UT 64, 29 P.3d 1231. On 
4 
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each occasion, Houston was not relied upon for the decision. In Gardner, the party 
Ci) opposing enforcement of the contract even cited Houston for the proposition that "any 
contract entered into by a dissolved corporation beyond winding-up is void." Gardner, 
949 P.2d at 789. The Gardner Court shrugged off this suggestion and held that the 
contract was not void. See id. 
The majority in Miller did not even cite to, let alone rely upon, Houston. While 
Respondents cite to Miller's dissenting opinion, they fail to distinguish the ruling that a 
contract entered into with a dissolved corporation is "voidable at defendants' option." 
Miller, 2001 UT 64, ,r 16. Had the Miller Court determined that the contract at issue was 
(i) void as described in Houston, meaning a contract that is "of no effect whatsoever," 
Consol. Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268,273 n.7 (Utah Ct. 
App.1996), this ruling and the underlying analysis would have been unnecessary. 
A'S\ 
• 
Respondents argue that, pursuant to Houston and consistent with Utah case law 
since Houston, a contract entered by a dissolved entity may be void or voidable 
depending on who tries to enforce it. But Utah decisions since Houston make clear that 
this is not the case. "A void contract is one which never had any legal existence or effect, 
and such contract cannot in any manner have life breathed into it," and is, therefore, 
different from a contract found to be (under the facts of a particular case) in 
contravention of a statute. Consol. Realty, 930 P.2d at 273. "The term 'void' can only be 
properly applied to ... contracts that are of no effect whatsoever." Id. at n. 7. 
Thus, a void contract, e.g., a contract regarding "gambling or immorality", cannot 
be enforced by anyone. See, e.g., McCormick v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 308 P.2d 949, 
5 
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951 (Utah 1957). A voidable contract, on the other hand, may still be enforced by a party 
such as TNE. This is the lesson of this Court's post.-.Housron decisions. This is why 
courts look for acts that are "malum in se or malum prohibitum," rather than acts that are 
merely beyond the authority of the contracting party. Ockey, 2008 UT 37,122; Millard 
Co. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank of Millard Co., 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 (Utah 1932); Zion's Sav. 
Bank v. Tropic & East Fork Irr. Co., 126 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1942). No one argues that any 
such act occurred in this case. 
In short, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled it was bound by Houston to 
decide the issue of whether the TNE Trust Deed was void as against public policy. 
Respondents also argue that, despite the fact section 48-1-32(1) contains no public 
policy statement, the language of that statute, consistent with Houston, makes clear that 
the TNE Trust Deed is void as against public policy. Respondents offer no legal support 
for this conclusion. 
Respondents recognize that the provisions of section 48-1-32(1) "convey a benefit 
on third-parties dealing with a dissolved partnership." Respondents' Br., p.19. 
Respondents argue that, despite the protection afforded to third parties, section 48-1-3 2 
nevertheless requires voiding any contract in contravention of its tenns. See id. 
Respondents argument on this point seems to come down to the assertion that, "to 
hold otherwise ... would result in the nullification" of the statute. Id. This ignores 
numerous decisions that have applied estoppel, waiver or other doctrines, given the right 
factors, to prevent a party from invoking the protections of various statutes. See Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irr. Co., 2011 UT 33, 258 P.3d 539 (estoppel from asserting 
6 
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the statute of frauds); Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P .2d 487 (Utah App. 1994) 
@ . · (estoppel to assert statute of limitations); ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mtn. Resorts, L. C., 2010 
UT 65, if 14, n.3, 245 P.3d 184 ("[w]aiver or estoppel may be found in the face of a 
mandatory statute"). This does not "nullify" a statute; it prevents a party from unfairly 
invoking it. 
• 
Respondents' argument also ignores the applicable language of the statute, section 
48-1-32(1), itself: 
After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership, except as 
provided in paragraph (3): 
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership 
affairs or completing transactions unfinished at dissolution. 
(b) By any transaction which would bind the 
partnership, if dissolution had not taken place, provided the 
other party to the transaction: 
(i) had extended credit to the partnership prior to 
dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of the dissolution; 
or 
(ii) though he had not so extended credit, had 
nevertheless known of the partnership prior to dissolution, 
and, having no knowledge or notice of dissolution, the fact of 
dissolution had not been advertised in a newspaper of general 
circulation .... 
Utah Code Ann.§ 48-1-32(1). If anything, this statute assists a third party (such as TNE) 
by broadening the types of contracts that may be enforced despite the dissolution of a 
partnership. But Respondents point to no part of this statute that could lead to a 
7 
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conclusion that a contract in violation of this section is void ab initio. This is because no 
such language exists. 1 
Respondents are also unable to explain away the fact that the statute currently in 
place, section 48-2e-804, expressly allows for contracts such as the TNE Trust Deed. 
The reason for this change was to "balance the interests ... of outside creditors who have 
no notice of the partnership's dissolution," to "eliminate[ e] the special and 
confusing ... rules limiting the authority of partners after dissolution," and to "enhanc[ e] 
the protection of innocent third parties." Rev. Unif. Part. Act§ 804, Comment. 
The fact that "current statutory law expressly authorize[ s] the contract" at issue, 
Howickv. Salt Lake City Corp., 2013 UT App 218, ~ 42,310 P.3d 1220, and that this 
change was to further protect third parties without knowledge of dissolution such as 1NE, 
confirms that the 1NE Trust Deed is not contrary to public policy. 
Ultimately, Respondents argue that, because the 1NE Transaction fell outside of 
the terms of section 48-1-32(1), the Court of Appeals was correct in declaring it void. 
This argument fails to consider the actual ruling of the Court of Appeals, which was 
based on Houston rather than the language of section 48-1-32. In any event, this 
argument fails to undertake the necessary analysis. "Not every legislative enactment, of 
course, embodies public policy; only those which protect the public or promote public 
interest qualify." Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989); see also 
1 Interestingly, the only portion of this statute that comes close, subparagraph (3), 
provides that, in certain circumstances, "a partnership is in no case bound." Utah Code 
Ann. 48-1-32(3). This provision was found by the trial court to be inapplicable here. 
Concl. 41 (R.12475). This is why subparagraph (3) is not relied upon by Respondents. 
8 
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Lee v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66, ~ 24, 147 P.3d 443 (same). Many statutes, e.g., "simply 
{I) · regulate conduct between private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment 
does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns."' Peterson v. Browning, 832 P .2d 
1280, 1283 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, Ockey requires that a certain analysis be made to 
determine whether a contract in contravention of the statute violates public policy. 
This analysis presumes contracts are not void unless they clearly violate public 
policy, Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ~ 21, and requires a showing "free from doubt that the 
contract is against public policy." Penunuri v. Sundance Part., Ltd, 2013 UT 22, ,r 26, 
301 P .3d 984. "Unless no other conclusion is possible from the words of a statute it 
<i should not be held to make agreements contravening it totally void." Baldwin v. Burton, 
850 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Utah 1993). As made clear in Ockey, "[o]nly contracts that offend 
public policy or harm the public are void ab initio." 2008 UT 37, iJ 19. "Contracts that 
offend an individual, such as those arising from fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, are 
voidable." The TNE Trust Deed does not harm the public and arose "from fraud, 
misrepresentation, or mistake." 
In sum, there is no evidence that the TNE Trust Deed violates public policy, while 
the current statute authorizes the TNE Transaction. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred 
when it affirmed the trial court's ruling that the TNE Trust Deed was void. This decision 
should be reversed. 
II. HOUSTON SHOULD BE OVERRULED. 
Respondents argue that Houston should not be overruled, but fail to analyze any of 
the factors deemed necessary by this Court to make this determination. As described in 
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TNE's opening brief, analysis of the proper factors weighs in favor of overruling or 
otherwise disavowing Houston. 
The overriding concern is whether the prior decision "'was originally erroneous 
or is no longer sound because of changing conditions."' Bank of America v. Adamson, 
2017 UT 2, 'if 9 (quoting Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64, 'if 23, 356 P. 3d 
1172). Also important is whether there has been a substantial amount of reliance on the 
prior decision. Scott, 2015 UT 64, 'if 23. 
Each of these factors weigh in favor of overruling Houston. As described in 
TNE's opening brief and above, there is no question that conditions have changed. Case 
law recognizes that contracts with dissolved entities are not simply void, statutes have 
been added that recognize certain situations require that such contracts be enforceable. 
The law set forth in Houston does not mesh with such changed conditions. 
Moreover, no case, other than Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 (Utah 
1978), which only mentioned Houston in dicta, has relied on Houston for its ruling. 
"When a doctrine has not been necessary to the outcome of many cases, it is unlikely that 
the public has relied on it in any substantial way." Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, iJ 
36, 345 P.2d 553. 
Also, as set forth in TNE's opening brief, the "presumption against overruling 
precedent is not equally strong in all cases." Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, 'if 22. Precedents are 
considered "less weighty" when the decision at issue is not based on "persuasive 
authority" and where cases since that time have simply not relied on such precedent since 
it was handed down. Id. Part of this analysis again includes whether there has been 
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reliance on the precedent and whether "the precedent has become inconsistent with other 
e principles oflaw." Id., 140. 
Houston, to the extent it voiced a ruling that contracts with dissolved entities are 
always void, has not been relied upon, is not based on any particular authority (let alone 
persuasive authority) and has become inconsistent both with case law and applicable 
statutes. 
Respondents say nothing about any of these factors. Instead, Respondents argue 
that overruling Houston will do more harm than good because, "operating outside of that 
presumption [that all contracts are void] would threaten to bind dissolved entities - and 
., their innocent members or partners - in all instances where a third party sees benefit in 
that transaction." Respondents' Br., p. 23. This assertion is unsupported and, as set forth 
above, misconstrues the nature of this case. Not all contracts with dissolved entities are 
at issue here - only contracts where a third party does not know of the dissolution, under 
circumstances where it would simply be unfair to declare the contract unenforceable. 
The question is not whether the contract is valid; the question is whether the contract is 
void and incapable of enforcement. 
Houston says all such contracts are void ab initio. Utah case law and statutory law 
now say otherwise. Under such conditions, abandonment of Houston is appropriate. 
11 
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III. RESPONDENTS FAIL TO SHOW THAT THE GENERAL RULE OF 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION SHOULD NOT APPLY 
Respondents argue that, if this Court overrules or disavows Houston, it would be 
"improper" for this Court to apply the ruling retroactively to encompass this case. This 
argument ignores Utah law. 
"The general rule from time immemorial is that the ruling of a court is deemed to 
state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984); Monarrez v. Utah Dept. oJTransp., 2014 UT App 
219, ilil 30-33, 335 P. 3d 913. This is the general rule, which, while not inviolable, 
applies unless a party arguing against retroactive application shows there has been 
')ustifiable reliance on the prior state of the law or that the retroactive application of the 
new law may otherwise create an undue burden." Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n 
of Utah, 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 1993). 
Respondents fail to address, let alone meet this burden. In any event, 
Respondents cannot make such a showing. Respondents claim they were not even aware 
of the TNE Trust Deed until after it was executed and after TNE had disbursed funds to 
the Dissolved Partnership. Reliance, such as the reliance on existing tax laws mentioned 
in Kennecott, id., simply was not possible. Even if one assumes Respondents knew about 
the TNE Trust Deed, reliance on the rule in Houston would not be "justifiable." Instead, 
Respondents would be allowed to sit back, accept TNE's funds, and subsequently move 
to set aside the TNE Trust Deed without having to return TNE's funds. No such 
12 
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"reliance" could be condoned. Either way, Respondents cannot show that only 
@ prospective application is justifiable here. 
• 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the district court's ruling that, as a 
matter of law, the TNE Trust Deed was void as against public policy. Alternatively, the 
time has come to overrule or disavow Houston. 
RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
After trial, Respondents filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-5-826. The trial court issued an Order on February 4, 2014 ("2/4/14 Order"), 
~ denying Respondents' request on two separate bases: (1) fees were not recoverable by 
any party in this action under the TNE Trust Deed, precluding an award of fees under§ 
78B-5-826; and (2) even if fees were awardable, neither party "prevailed" as required by 
§ 78B-5-826. See R.11760. Respondents appealed from these rulings. 
•· 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on the following basis: 
There is no validity to any claim derived from the trust 
deed because the deed was void ab initio. See Consolidated 
Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268,273 n.7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he term 'void' can only be properly 
applied to those contracts that are of no effect whatsoever, 
such as are a mere nullity[.]"). Thus, Wittingham is not 
entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the 
trust deed, regardless of what the proper interpretation of the 
terms of that agreement might be if the contract were valid, 
because the agreement is wholly void. Generally, "attorney 
fees may be awarded only when they are authorized by statute 
or contract." Fericks v. Lucy Ann So.ffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 1 
23, 100 P.3d 1200. As the only contract between the parties 
was one that was wholly void and as Wittingham has 
identified no independent statutory basis upon which we may 
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grant it attorney fees, it follows that its request for fees must 
be denied. 
Wittingham, LLC, et al., v. TNE Ltd. Partnership, et al., 2016 UT App 187, 113. The 
Court of Appeals did not address the other aspects of the trial court's rulings regarding 
the denial of Respondents' request for attorney fees. 
Respondents now seek reversal of the decision set forth above. Respondents also 
request that this Court detennine whether the trial court erred when it otherwise denied 
Respondents' request for fees. 
Respondents' request fails for multiple reasons. First, the Court of Appeals did 
not err when it ruled that a void trust deed cannot give rise to a claim for attorney fees. 
Second, Respondents may not seek reversal pursuant to a petition for certiorari, because 
there is no decision for this Court to review. Finally, this Court may affirm on any basis 
apparent on the record, and the record shows that the trial court did not err when it denied 
Respondents' claim for attorney fees. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR. 
As set forth above, the basis for the Court of Appeals' opinion sustaining the trial 
court's denial of attorney fees was the holding that "[t]here is no validity to any claim 
derived from the trust deed because the deed was void ab initio." Respondents fail to 
show this ruling was erroneous. 
Once a contract is deemed void, it is as if it never existed. "A void contract is 
' [ o ]ne which never had any legal existence or effect, and such contract cannot in any 
manner have life breathed into it." Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 
14 
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930 P.2d 268, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1412 (5th Ed. 
'- 1979)); see also Zollinger v. Carrol, 49 P.3d 402, 405 (Idaho 2002) ("(t]he law is well 
settled ... that illegal contracts are void and cannot be enforced"). "A contract or a deed 
that is void cannot be ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity in court.'' 
Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ,r 18, 189 P.3d 51. Moreover, "[o]ne not a party to an 
illegal contract cannot ... derive any benefit from the contract, even if the contract was 
entered into in his or her behalf." Zollinger, 49 P.3d at 405. Indeed, the law is clear that 
no person may rely on a void contract for any reason. See id; Short v. Bullion-Beck & 
Champion Min. Co., 57 P.720 (Utah 1899); Warner Bros. Theaters v. Cooper 
• Foundation, 189 F.2d 825, 829 (l0thCir. 1951) ("where a plaintiff cannot establish a 
cause of action without relying upon an illegal contract, the courts will deny relief"). 
Because the TNE Trust Deed was deemed void, and therefore a nullity, 
Respondents are not entitled to fees under the reciprocal fee statute. Section 78B-5-826 
provides that a court "may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing ... when the 
provisions of the [ writing] allow at least one party to recover attorney fees." Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-5-826. Here, the provisions of the trust deed were deemed void, and therefore 
a nullity, and should not be deemed to form the basis for a contractual fee award. 
Respondents cite to no case law that allows for such a remedy despite a ruling that the 
agreement itself is void for illegality. Instead, Respondents cite to Hooban v. Unicity 
Int 'l., Inc., 2012 UT 40, 227 P .3d 256, which dealt with a valid contract to which Hooban 
was not a party. A void contract is "different from a contract which has been invalidated, 
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breached or terminated." Consolidated Realty, 930 P.2d at 273. A void contract "never 
had any existence" and therefore cannot be the basis for a contractual fee request. 
Moreover, given the determination that the TNE Trust Deed is void, application 
of section 78B-5-826 would contravene the purpose of the statute - to "create a level 
playing field for parties to a contractual dispute." PC Crane Service, LLC v. Mc Queen 
Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 61, il 23, 273 P.3d 396. The statute "affords to the party not 
benefitted by a contractual attorney fee provision the same access to attorney fees that the 
provision explicitly affords to the other party." Id. Because neither party may utilize any 
provision of a void contract, Respondent's request for fees was properly denied. 
II. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REVIEW AND 
REVERSAL OF ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
Pages 27 through 36 of Respondents' Brief asks this Court to review the trial 
court's denial of Respondents' request for attorney fees. This is not permissible. 
"It is a fundamental tenet of certiorari review that we review the decision of the 
court of appeals, not that of the trial court." Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, il 7 984 P. 2d 98 
( quotations and citation omitted). Thus, certiorari review is not a "new and unrestricted 
opportunity for comprehensive appellate review of the trial court's decree." Id. Here, 
because the Court of Appeals did not address the issues contained in pages 27-36 of 
Respondents' Brief, this Court may, at best, only "remand the untreated issues to the 
court of appeals for proper consideration." Id., il 9; see also Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 
89, 16 P. 3d 540, il 26 ("Because on certiorari we do not review the decision of the trial 
court, but only that of the court of appeals, we remand to the court of appeals to review 
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the trial court's decision."); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P. 2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) ("[t]his 
vi> · Court's grant of a petition for certiorari does not allow a second plenary appeal."). 
Accordingly, Respondents' argument for ~eversal cannot succeed. 
III. THIS COURT CAN AFFIRM ON OTHER GROUNDS APPARENT 
ON THE RECORD. 
While this Court cannot simply reverse the Court of Appeals on a basis not 
decided by the Utah Court of Appeals, see above, and see Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 
Ci 13 n.3, 52 P. 3d 1158, it may affirm the result reached by the court of appeals on a 
different ground. See Debry, 889 P.2d at 443; Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ,I18, 29 
P. 3d 1225. "This is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed 
on by the lower court." Diploma, id. 
a. The Trial Court Properly Applied Section 78B-5-826 to the TNE Trust 
Deed. 
Respondents argue they are entitled to fees under section 78B-5-826, which 
provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing ... when the provisions of the ... writing allow at least 
one party to recover attorney fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. 
Below, the sole basis for this argument in Respondents' opening memorandum 
was a recitation to paragraph 4 of the TNE Trust Deed along with an argument that "the 
main issue of contention between Respondents and the TNE Defendants was the 
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enforceability of the Trust Deed and each party's right to the security thereof, i.e. the 
Property." 9/14/13 Mem. (R.9841), p. 18. Respondents subsequently argued in their 
reply brief that paragraph 11 of the TNE Trust Deed also applied. See 10/25/13 Reply 
Br. (R.10461), pp.6-7. 
The trial court ruled that application of section 78B-5-826 did not support an 
award of attorney fees. See 2/4/14 Order, ,I,r 2, 6-24. The court found that paragraph 4 
did not provide a basis for either party to claim an award of attorney's fees in this case. 
Specifically, the court found that the plain language of paragraph 4, "is not an attorney's 
fees provision, was not intended to apply to the circumstances of this matter, and is 
tantamount to an indemnity agreement on the part of the Trustor." Id., i16. Ultimately, 
the court found that this provision was "inapplicable to the circumstances of this case," 
and "inapplicable to form the basis for an award of attorney's fees under[§ 78B-5-826]." 
Id., ilil 6, 12. The court held that neither party would have been entitled to fees under this 
provision. See id., ilil 17-18. 
The trial court also found that paragraph 11 "does not constitute a basis for 
[Respondents] to recover their attorney's fees in this matter," that it was "inapplicable in 
this matter because what was at issue was the validity of the TNE Trust Deed ... this was 
not a default action," and that "none of the TNE Defendants undertook in this case any of 
the actions set forth in Section 1 (" See id., ifil 19-21. Accordingly, neither party would 
have been entitled to fees pursuant to this provision. See id., i122. The court applied this 
same ruling to paragraph 7 of the Note, due to its similar wording. See id., ilil 23-24. 
Respondents provide no reason to reverse these rulings. "Generally, attorney fees 
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are awarded only when authorized by contract or statute." Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 
(t 26, ,r 11, 160 P .3d 1041. Respondents have no contractual right to fees, but argue 
entitlement under section 78B-5-826. 
Section 78B-5-826 "does not create an independent right to a fee award that the 
contract's attorney fee provision would not allow to either party simply because the fee 
provision is one-sided." PC Crane Serv., LLC v. McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 
61, ,r 23, 273 P.3d 396). Instead, the "statute is triggered only when the provisions of the 
contract would allow at least one party to recover fees if that party had prevailed under its 
theory of the case." Bushnell v. Barker, 2012 UT 20, ,r 11,274 P.3d 968; see also 
@ _. Hooban v. Unicity Int'/., Inc., 2012 UT 40, ,r 25, 285 P.3d 766 (a contract must allow "at 
least one party to recover attorney fees under a hypothetical alternative in which the case 
was resolved the other way"). This statute ensures only "that both sides receive the 
<i benefit of a contractual fee-shifting provision - beyond guaranteeing reciprocity, the law 
doesn't create any new rights ... each party's right to recover is the inverse of the other's, 
no more and no less." Trugreen Companies, LLC v. Mower Bros., Inc., 570 Fed.Appx. 
775, 777 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing McQueen Masonry, Hooban). 
Thus, the mere fact that a contact mentions the term "attorney's fees" is 
insufficient to justify a fee award in all circumstances. See Maynard v. Wharton, 912 
P.2d 446,451 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (a contract "does not contemplate an award of 
attorney fees for sellers just because buyers sued"). "If a right to attorney fees is based on 
a contract provision, the court must apply the contractual attorney fee provision ... 
strictly in accordance with the contract's terms." Dale K. Barker Co., PC v. Bushnell, 
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2009 UT App 385, ,r 6, 222 P.3d 1188, ajf'd in part, rev 'din part, 2012 UT 20. 
Below, Respondents cited to two paragraphs, ,r 4 and ,r 11, in the 1NE Trust Deed 
as the basis for their argument that fees are proper. Paragraph 4 states: 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES: 
***** 
To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof, the title to said property, or the rights or powers of 
Beneficiary or Trustee, and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also 
appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and 
expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a 
reasonable sum incurred by the Beneficiary or Trustee. 
TNE Trust Deed, ,r 4 (emphasis added). 
The TNE Trust Deed, like any contract, is interpreted by its plain terms by looking 
to its "four comers to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling." Holladay 
Towne Center, LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, ,r 10, 198 P.3d 
990. The plain terms of paragraph 4 require that an action be initiated by a third party 
that "affect[ s] the security" set forth in the TNE Trust Deed. If and when that occurs, 
"trustor agrees ... to appear in and defend any [such] action." If the beneficiary "elect[s] 
to also appear in or def end any such action," Truster agrees to pay attorney's fees 
incurred by the beneficiary. 
The trial court carefully parsed the plain language of paragraph 4 and determined 
that none of these conditions occurred in this case. Among other determinations, the 
court noted that "[Respondents] brought suit in this matter to invalidate the TNE Trust 
Deed," while TNE "elected to appear and defend against [Respondents'] claims to 
invalidate the TNE Trust Deed." 2/4/14 Order, ,r 11. Based on the plain language of 
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paragraph 4, the court ruled it was uinapplicable to the circumstances of this case," 
because the section "require[ s] [Respondents] to def end against third party claims 
attacking the validity of the TNE Trust Deed and to pay TNE's costs and expenses if the 
TNE Defendants appeared and defended against such claims." Id., il 12. The court also 
held, inter alia, that this paragraph was an insufficient basis to award fees to either party, 
as "no claim in this action for indemnification [was] made by the TNE Defendants." Id., 
114. Accordingly, "had the TNE Defendants asserted a claim for indemnification, the 
Court would not have granted attorney's fees." Id., 117. 
This ruling is consistent with Utah authority that holds when a contract specifies 
the circumstances in which attorney fees may be awarded, absence of such circumstances 
will preclude an award of fees to either side. See McQueen Masonry, 2012 UT App 61, 1 
23; Velocity Press v. Key Bank, NA, 570 Fed. Appx. 783, 793 (10th Cir. 2014) (reversing 
a determination on fees because "the language of the promissory note allowed [recovery] 
only in limited circumstances, none of which were present in this case."); Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Utah 1986) (fee award is improper "when it is not 
based on the terms contained in the parties' agreement"); Loosle v. First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) (party failed to show that trust deed fee 
provision was applicable to quiet title action). 
Respondents fail to show this interpretation was erroneous. Rather than address 
the plain language of the relevant provisions, or the relevant Utah authorities, 
Respondents argue that the trial court erred by failing to interpret paragraph 4 more 
expansively, by failing to consider paragraph 6 (though that provision was not mentioned 
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by Respondents), and by failing to consider legal authorities that were not even presented 
to the trial court. 
The argument that the trial court should have read paragraph 4 more expansively 
is contrary to Utah law requiring a "plain tenns" interpretation. Holladay Towne Center, 
2008 UT App 420, iJ 10. The remaining arguments are new and unpreserved. 
Respondents argue that, had the trial court applied paragraph 6 of the TNE Trust Deed, 
along with a slew of new case law, most of which interpret a California fee statute, it 
would have ruled in Respondents' favor. See Respondents' Br., pp. 28-31. These 
arguments were not presented below and therefore may not be considered on appeal. See 
Gowe v. lntermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App 105, iJ 7 ("we generally do not 
address unpreserved arguments raised for the first time on appeal"); Patterson v. 
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, il 12, 266 P.3d 828 (same). 
Respon4ents never mentioned paragraph 6 below. Respondents did not even 
include paragraph 6 in their exhibit presented to the trial court. See Ex. A. to 9/14/13 
Memo. Supp. Mot. for Fees (R.9841). As such, the trial court never had the opportunity 
to consider its application. The trial court based its decision on sections 4 and 11, 
because those were the only provisions mentioned by Respondents. Because the 
argument regarding section 6 was not properly raised, it may not be raised or considered 
on appeal. See Gowe, 2015 UT App 105, il 7. In any event, paragraph 6 begins with a 
similar proviso contained in paragraph 4 ("Should Trustor fail to make any payment or do 
any act as herein provided ... ) and therefore does not provide an independent basis upon 
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Similarly, none of the cases or arguments Respondents rely upon are found in the 
@ memoranda supporting their motion for fees and, therefore, should not be considered for 
the first time on appeal. "[W]hether termed issues, arguments, theories or claims, all 
matters must be first presented to the district court to preserve them for appeal, as we will 
not reverse ... for a reason not first presented to that court." Id, iJ 9 n.2. "Presentation of 
one argument ... does not preserve for appeal any alternative arguments, even regarding 
the same issue." Id. 
Even if the Court considers the new cases cited by Respondents, the argument 
relating to the bulk of these cases is insufficiently briefed. The standard for briefing is set 
'i forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which, "[i]mplicity ... 
requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see 
also Valcarce, 961 P .2d at 313. "We have previously stated that this court is not a 
'depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research."' Id. ( citation omitted). 
Respondents cite generally to some 25 cases, broadly stating that the facts of each 
case are "similar" to those at bar, and that most of these cases contained "the [fee] 
provision at issue." Respondents' Br., p. 29. Respondents ask the court to sort through 
these cases and decide whether the contract language, facts and subsequent analysis 
applies here. This is not the Court's obligation; Respondents have "impermissibly shifted 
the burden of analysis to the reviewing court in this case." Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 
370, ,r 9, 995 P.2d 14. 
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To the extent Respondents provide any analysis, it relates to two cases, neither of 
which show reversible error. Respondents rely on In re Pando, 1984 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 
24486, an unreported bankruptcy case. That was not a fee case under § 78B-5-826, but 
one dealing with objections to a Chapter 13 plan to change the terms of an existing 
obligation, and application of an inapposite bankruptcy statute. Moreover, that court 
relied on a provision unlike paragraphs 4 and 11, the only relevant provisions here. 
Respondents also quote from Valley Bible Ctr. v. Western Title Ins. Co., 138 Cal.App.3d 
931 (Cal.App.5th 1983 ), but that case dealt with a different California fee statute and an 
action to "block a trustee's sale," not a declaratory claim to set aside a deed. Id. at 932. 
Accordingly, even if this argument had been preserved, Respondents fail to show error. 
Respondents also argue that paragraph 11 of the TNE Trust Deed requires an 
award of attorney fees in this case. Paragraph 11 states in relevant part: 
Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time 
without notice ... enter upon and take possession of said property or any 
part thereof, in its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, 
and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as 
Beneficary may deter:mine. 
TNE Trust Deed, ,r 11. 
This provision contains an initial factual predicate, "upon any default by Trustor." 
If such a default occurs, "Beneficiary may ... sue in its own name for ... rents ... " If 
beneficiary does so, it may then apply those rents, "less ... reasonable attorney's fees, upon 
any indebtedness secured hereby." The trial court held that none of these conditions 
occurred: "The Court finds that Section 11 is inapplicable in this matter because what 
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was at issue was the validity of the TNE Trust Deed, not an effort by the TNE Defendants 
~ to take any of the actions set forth in Section 11." 2/4/14 Order, if 20. The court made 
clear that, "because ... this case was not a default action, the Court would not have 
awarded the TNE Defendants attorney's fees under Section 11 had they prevailed." Id., ,r 
22. 
This ruling precludes an award of attorney fees under the TNE Trust Deed. See 
Faulkner, 714 P.2d at 1150-51 ("the contractual language does not award fees to the 
prevailing party who succeeds in enforcing the agreement, but against the defaulting 
party whose default necessitates enforcement"); McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 
61, iJ 16 ("Default, however, must have occurred in accordance with the terms of the 
contract."); Faulkner, 714 P.2d at 1150-51; Maynardv. Wharton, 912 P.2d at 451-52 
(holding that only a default anticipated by the governing contract allows for attorney 
i> fees); B. Investment, L.C. v. Anderson,2012 UT App 24, ilil 32-33, 270 P.3d 548 (same). 
Respondents fail to show any error committed by the trial court relating to its 
interpretation of paragraph 11. Respondents point to no claims or counterclaims that 
~ 
somehow invoked the "default" provisions contained in paragraph 11 or paragraph 7 of 
the Note. 
Instead, Respondents argue that, because TNE recorded a Notice of Default on 
February 4, 2011 (19 months after Respondents filed this lawsuit), and because 
Respondents sought an injunction relating to the Notice, Respondents are entitled to all 
fees they have incurred in this case. See Respondents' Br., p.32. Respondents point to 
no language in paragraph 11 that allows for fees under this circumstance. 
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Further, Respondents provide no authority that could justify the relief requested, to 
wit, all fees incurred from the inception to the end of the case. A party seeking fees "must 
allocate its fee request according to its underlying claims." Foote v. Clark, 962 P .2d 52, 
55 (Utah 1998); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). 
"While a trial court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for failure to allocate, it 
may not award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to 
separate claims and/or parties." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 318. Accordingly, Respondents' 
request for all fees incurred in this case is without legal basis. Moreover, Respondents 
never requested fees relating solely to their motion for injunctive relief and never sought 
to allocate the fees related solely to that motion. As such, there is no evidentiary basis for 
this request, either. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. 
Ultimately, Respondents request that this Court rewrite the TNE Trust Deed to 
include more general provisions for attorney fees that do not exist. Respondents' request 
must be denied. See UP.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303,141, 990 
P.2d 945 ("[A] court may not make a better contract for the parties ... [and] may not 
enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself."). Respondents' 
interpretation requires a contract that states "attorney fees shall be awarded in any action 
relating to this trust deed." No such language can be found here. Because "the party 
seeking an award of attorney fees under a contract must establish that the contract's terms 
anticipate such an award," McQueen, 2012 UT App 61, ,I 9, and because Respondents 
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b. Determination of "Prevailing Party." 
As a separate basis for denying Respondents' motion for fees, the trial court held 
that Respondents did not qualify as a "prevailing party," precluding application of section 
.. 
78B-5-826. See 2/4/14 Order, 1126-34. Respondents urge that the court abused its 
discretion in reaching this determination, but fail to make this showing. 
A "prerequisite" to application of the reciprocal fee statute "is that the party 
requesting fees prevailed in a civil action based upon a written agreement." Anderson & 
Karrenberg v. Warnick, 2012 UT App 275, 110, 289 P.3d 600. "'Which party is the 
prevailing party is an appropriate question for the trial court' and 'depends, to a large 
~ · measure, on the context of each case.'" Id., ,r 11 ( quoting R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 
UT 11, 125, 40 P .3d 1119). Appellate courts "defer to the trial court on the question of 
which party prevailed because it is in the best position to make that determination." Id.; 
<i see also Cook, 1 24 ("it is appropriate to leave this determination to the sound discretion 
of the trial court"). 
Relevant factors for the trial court's consideration include, but are not limited to: 
'(l) [the] contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, 
cross-claims, etc., brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims 
relative to each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit 
considered as a whole, and ( 4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded 
in connection with the various claims.' 
Smith v. Simas, 2014 UT App 78, iJ 29, 324 P.3d 667 (quoting Cook, 2002 UT 11, iJ 25). 
This case-by-case approach affords the trial court the "flexibility to handle circumstances 
where both, or neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed." Id. Importantly, 
[the] hallmark for determining which party has prevailed is ... whether the 
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trial court's decision about who prevailed was based on an approach that 
was flexible and reasoned. 
Nejf v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 70,247 P.3d 380. 
The trial court considered the factors set forth above, including: ( 1) the contractual 
language, see 2/4/14 Order, ,r,r 6-24; (2) the number and import of various claims, see id., 
,r,r 28-33; and (3) the "case as a whole," taking into account the "totality of circumstances 
and each party's relative successes on the claims presented." Id., ,r 33. Based on these 
and other considerations, including the equities of the case, the court determined that 
Respondents were pot "prevailing parties" entitled to fees. 
Respondents do not argue that the trial court failed to apply the proper factors, nor 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings made by the court. Instead, 
"the challenge is really to the adequacy of the findings." Centennial Pointe Owners' 
Assoc. v. Onyeabor, 2009 UT App 325, *3 (mem.); In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ,r 61,201 P.3d 
985. This challenge was not preserved below, whether by objections to the trial court's 
findings or per a post-trial motion. As a result, this argument may not be asserted on 
appeal. See Onyeabor, 2009 UT App 325, *3; In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ,r,r 61-63; 438 Main 
St. v. Easy Heat, 2004 UT 72, ,r 56; Cook v. Cook, 2013 UT App 57, ,I,r 2-3 ("Because 
Husband failed to object to the trial court's findings, his attacks on those findings are 
unpreserved"). 
Respondents otherwise fail to show the trial court abused its discretion. See 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998) (holding an abuse 
of discretion exists where "there is no reasonable basis for the decision"). Respondents 
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were successful on their First Cause of Action for declaratory relief for which 
(I) Respondents neither asked for nor received any monetary judgment or attorney fees. See 
First Am. Comp I., pp. 15-17, 3 7. Respondents did not succeed on their separate tort 
claims, each of which sought monetary relief against TNE. See Mem. Dec. (R.9784). 
••• 
Respondents' central argument throughout the course of this case and at trial - that Nick 
Muir was incompetent - was rejected by the Court. See id. Another central argument -
that the Dissolved Partnership was not a party to the TNE Trust Deed - also failed. See 
id. Respondents also made much of their "red flags" argument throughout this case; that 
theory was not even addressed by the Court. See id. The fact that Respondents ultimately 
succeeded on one cause of action, based on one theory (whether the TNE Trust Deed was 
a "winding up" event), given the total context of this case, does not show that the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
For instance, the Neff Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied a request for attorney fees, as the parties mostly fought off each other's 
claims. See Neff, 2011 UT 6, ilil 70-73. In Westmont Mirador LLC v. Shurtliff, 2014 UT 
App 184,333 P.3d 369, this Court affirmed the denial of attorney fees on the basis that 
"[n]either side prevailed completely," and given the existence of unsuccessful claims and 
cross-claims. Id., iJiI 12-13. In Anderson & Karrenberg, 2012 UT App 275, this Court 
affirmed a ruling that neither party was successful. See id. iJil 11-14 ("We cannot 
conclude that the trial court exceeded its broad discretion in reaching this conclusion. the 
court was familiar with the claims advanced, the allegations made, and the damages 
requested by each party .... "); see also Smith v. Simas, 2014 UT App 78, i131 ("On this 
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record, it was within the trial court's discretion to determine that neither party prevailed 
and to consequently deny an award of attorney fees to both parties"). 
Given the circumstances of this case, Respondents fail to show that there was no 
reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, 
this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that there was no "prevailing party" for 
purposes of Respondents' fee request. 
c. The Equities of the Case Preclude an Award of Attorney Fees. 
Under the plain language of section 78B-5-826, "[a] court may award costs and 
attorney's fees, but is not required to do so." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, 117. Use of the 
word "may" "indicates that courts have broad discretion in applying equitable principles 
in fixing the amount of any award of fees under the statute." Id., 1 21. 
Here, the trial court specifically found that the equities of the case do not support 
an award of attorney fees. See 2/4/14 Order, 1132-35. First, the court found it would be 
"unfair, unjust and inequitable to award attorney's fees based on Respondents' argument 
that there is a common core of facts between Respondents' winding up claim under Utah 
Code Ann. 48-1-32 and Respondents' other claims." Id., 132. The court also held that, 
given the "totality of circumstances," each party's relative successes, and the fact that 
Plaintifffs failed to prove Nick's incompetency, "which was a major and large percentage 
of what occurred in this case," "the Court finds that it would not be equitable to award 
Respondents attorney's fees against the TNE Defendants in this case." Id., iJ133, 35 
Respondents fail to address these factual determinations and ignore the trial 
court's ruling on this issue altogether. As such, Respondents' fail to show the court 
30 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
abused its discretion and the ruling should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents fail to show any error committed by the Court of Appeals when it 
affirmed the denial of their request for attorney fees. Accordingly, this decision should 
be affirmed. Respondents otheiwise challenge a ruling that was never made and therefore 
are not entitled to the relief they seek. Further, because this Court can affirm on any 
ground, and because the record shows the trial court did not err. when denying the request 
for fees, that decision should be affirmed. 
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